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ABSTRACT        
In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., the Supreme Court 
rejected the Federal Circuit’s rigid application of the “teaching, 
suggestion, or motivation” test (TSM test), and replaced it with an 
“expansive and flexible” approach, in determining the question of 
obviousness.  Nevertheless, an expansive and flexible approach to 
obviousness may not be consistent with the international norms of 
practice if it is applied literally.  The U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office’s literal application of the KSR decision has essentially created 
another set of inflexible rules, which is contrary to the Supreme Court’s 
intent. 
       The Federal Circuit’s recent decision in In re Kubin cautiously 
revived “obvious to try” in its obviousness jurisprudence.  However, In 
re Kubin may not represent a clear precedent for determining 
obviousness in the biotechnological context.  Certain key technological 
factual issues were unclear when the court was making its judgment. 
       Commentators have suggested that “a fairly high obviousness 
threshold coupled with a fairly low disclosure requirement will produce 
a few very powerful patents in uncertain industries.”  Nevertheless, 
lowering the disclosure requirement in the biotechnological context 
would provide inventors incentives to retain more know-how and thus 
frustrate the purposes of the existing statutory exemptions, namely the 
“medical practice exemption” under 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) and the so called 
“FDA exemption” under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).  Therefore, this Article 
suggests that the high disclosure requirement for biotechnological 
patent applications should not be sacrificed as a tradeoff for a 
heightened obviousness standard. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Since the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in KSR 
International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. in 2007,1 the decision has created legal 
uncertainty concerning obviousness from at least three perspectives.  
First, the application of the obviousness doctrine between the Federal 
Circuit Court of Appeals and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
 
1.   KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398  (2007). 
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(PTO) are inconsistent.  Second, the PTO’s practice regarding the 
standard of obviousness before and after KSR lacks consistency.  Third, 
the obviousness standard in a re-examination proceeding after KSR for 
a patent issued before that decision is uncertain. 
 Though the KSR court revered Graham v. John Deere Co.2 as the 
highest principle in making obviousness determinations, the KSR 
decision has essentially created the same problem that the Graham 
court sought to resolve—that is, the inconsistency among the courts and 
the Patent Office. 
 In KSR, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s rigid 
application of “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” test (TSM test), and 
replaced it with an “expansive and flexible” approach, in determining 
the question of obviousness.3  Before KSR, the Federal Circuit had 
developed a more rigid approach, the TSM test.  In rejecting the rigid 
application of the TSM test, the Supreme Court replaced it with an 
expansive and flexible approach by stating that, “[t]he combination of 
familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious 
when it does no more than yield predictable results.”4 
 Nevertheless, an expansive and flexible approach to obviousness 
may not be consistent with the international norms of practice if it is 
applied literally.  Moreover, even if an expansive and flexible approach 
to obviousness is favorable and can be justified, the PTO’s literal 
application of the KSR decision has essentially created another set of 
inflexible rules for the determination of obviousness, which is contrary 
to the Supreme Court’s intent. 
 The Federal Circuit’s recent decision in In re Kubin cautiously 
revived “obvious to try” in its obviousness jurisprudence.5  The decision 
has narrowed the gaps between the court and the PTO after KSR to 
some extent.  However, In re Kubin may not represent a clear precedent 
for determining obviousness in the biotechnological context because 
certain key technological factual issues were unclear and unanswered 
when the court was making its judgment.6 
 Commentators have suggested that a judge-made industry-specific 
standard of patentability tailored for each industry in which certain 
common characteristics can be found is preferable.  Commentators also 
 
2. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
3. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 415.   
4. Id. at 416. 
5. In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351 (C.A. Fed. 2009). 
6. Id. 
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suggested that “a fairly high obviousness threshold coupled with a fairly 
low disclosure requirement will produce a few very powerful patents in 
uncertain industries.”7  Nevertheless, lowering the disclosure 
requirement in the biotechnological context would provide inventors 
incentives to retain more know-how and thus frustrate the purposes of 
the existing statutory exemptions, namely the “medical practice 
exemption” under 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)8 and the so called “FDA 
exemption” under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).9 
 This Article starts with the introduction of the historical 
background of obviousness as a requirement of patentability in various 
countries in Part II.  Part III further examines why biotechnology 
invention is especially vulnerable to the challenge on the ground of 
obviousness.  Part IV examines how the European Patent Office 
(“EPO”) and other major patent systems, such as Germany, the United 
Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and China have approached the issue of 
obviousness, especially in the biotechnological and pharmaceutical 
contexts. 
 Then the focus of this Article turns to the American patent system.  
Part V begins with the examination of the application of the Federal 
Circuit’s TSM test in biotechnological and pharmaceutical contexts 
before KSR, followed by the Supreme Court’s KSR test, and the 
Federal Circuit’s interpretation and application of obviousness test in 
the pharmaceutical context after KSR.  In addition, this Part examines 
and compares the obviousness tests and their application in 
biotechnology cases in the PTO’s practice before and after KSR.  A 
discussion of the Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Kubin follows, which 
may be deemed as a step in filling the gaps between the court and the 
PTO on the disagreement of obviousness standard in the 
 
7. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 
1682 (2003). 
8. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) provides that: 
 With respect to a medical practitioner’s performance of a medical activity that 
constitutes an infringement under section 271(a) or (b) of this title, the provisions of 
sections 281, 283, 284, and 285 of this title shall not apply against the medical 
practitioner or against a related health care entity with respect to such medical 
activity. 
9. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) provides that: 
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the 
United States or import into the United States a patented invention (other than a 
new animal drug or veterinary biological product (as those terms are used in the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913)) . . . solely for 
uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a 
Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs. 
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biotechnological context. 
 This Article suggests that a judge-made industry-specific standard of 
obviousness in biotechnological and pharmaceutical contexts is 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s teaching in KSR that the 
evaluation of obviousness should remain flexible.  Nevertheless, the 
current high disclosure requirement for biotechnological patent 
applications should not be sacrificed as a tradeoff for a heightened 
obviousness standard. 
II.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF OBVIOUSNESS 
 “Non-obviousness,” “inventive step,” or “inventive level” is a 
relatively new requirement of patentability compared to novelty and 
utility.10  Novelty and utility were regarded as common law prerequisites 
for the issuance of a privilege and the predecessors of patentability 
requirements.11  Unlike novelty or utility, non-obviousness is a product 
of modern patent law and was not developed until the middle of the 
nineteenth century and the early twentieth century.12 
 Section 103 of the present American Patent Act provides that 
obviousness shall be tested by reference to the differences between the 
invention and the prior art.13  The non-obviousness criterion was 
codified in the 1952 American Patent Act as a requirement that the 
claimed invention taken as a whole not be obvious to one of ordinary 
skill in the art at the time the invention was made.14 
 The new provision was intended by Congress to abolish the “flash 
of genius” test set by the Supreme Court and to instigate a milder 
standard of inventiveness.15  However, there was no case law or 
literature about the meaning of the new provision until 1966 in the 
Supreme Court’s opinion, Graham v. John Deere Co.16 
 Across the Atlantic Ocean, it was not until the British Patent Act of 
1977, the inventive step, which was the European counterpart of 
obviousness, was fully introduced into the British patent statute as a 
separate patentability requirement.17  In England, though the 
 
10. Friedrich-Karl Beier, The Inventive Step in Its Historical Development, 3 I.I.C. 301, 
301–03 (1986). 
11. Id. at 302–03. 
12. Id. at 303. 
13. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000). 
14. Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1648–49; 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000). 
15. Beier, supra note 10, at 309. 
16. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
17. Beier, supra note 10, at 313. 
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requirement of an inventive step was first introduced in 1932 into the 
British patent statute,18 it was initially only as a ground for revocation of 
issued patents.19 
 It was recognized in England, earlier than elsewhere, that a small 
step may advance the art.20  Contrary to the United States’ patent 
system, as Friedrich-Karl Beier has stated, the primary emphasis of the 
introduction of inventive step to the British patent system was the 
technical and economic importance of the differences between the prior 
art and the claimed invention, rather than “the kind of creative criteria 
or the more or less ingenious abilities of the inventor.”21 
 As commentators have observed, in the United States, much of the 
case law concerning the person having ordinary skill in the art arises out 
of the consideration of the obviousness standard in § 103 of the Patent 
Act.22  It contributes to the result that the application of the person-
having-ordinary-skill-in-the-art standard varies by industry, which led 
to, for example, fewer but broader software patents, and more but 
narrower biotechnology patents.23 
 The development of a higher patentability requirement in Germany 
has its unique historical background.  In Friedrich-Karl Beier’s opinion, 
it was the creation of the protection of utility models for smaller 
technical improvements that freed the hands of the German patent 
system and German courts to demand additional prerequisites for 
patent protection and higher standards for the originality or works of 
applied arts.24 
 The German Utility Model Act of 1891 introduced a new form of 
protection which came into force with the amended Patent Act.25  Under 
the utility model system, in addition to the protection of examined 
patents, a simpler and faster protection could be obtained without 
previous examination.26  The protection of utility model, which still 
exists today, allowed the German patent system and courts to apply 
stricter standards for the longer lasting and better protected patents.27 
 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 312. 
21. Id. 
22. Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1648. 
23. Id. at 1650. 
24. Beier, supra note 10, at 319. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
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 Nevertheless, the requirement of patentability in Germany has 
changed in the process of harmonizing European patent law since the 
1960’s.28  The prerequisite of inventive step was introduced into the 
German patent statute.29  In addition, the advance in art, or technical 
progress, as a separate patentability requirement for seeking German 
patent protection was entirely dismissed.30 
 Though obviousness is a relatively new concept compared to other 
patentability requirements, the advance of technology has continuously 
challenged and forced the relevant authority to re-examine the 
feasibility of such a standard.  Specifically, the diversity of technologies 
today has raised the question whether a standard created before a 
specific industry emerging can be feasibly employed without 
modification to determine the inventiveness of an invention in such an 
industry.  Biotechnology is simply one among many examples. 
III.  THE NATURE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY MEDICATION AND 
PHARMACEUTICALS 
 Both traditional and modern definitions of biotechnology 
acknowledge that sharing techniques and experiment procedures are 
essential to the development of biotechnology.  Biotechnology has been 
generally defined as “the use of biology or biological process to develop 
helpful products and services.”31  A modern definition of biotechnology 
is “the set of biological techniques originally resulting from basic 
research, specifically molecular biology and genetic engineering, and 
now used for research and product development.”32  Popular examples 
of biotechnology techniques and processes include recombinant DNA, 
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) technology, DNA sequencing 
instruments, and expressed sequence tags (EST).33  These technologies 
and processes are all useful research tools which have greatly enhanced 
the progress of biotechnology.34 
 Though building-block technologies have enhanced the progress of 
biotechnology, in the mean time, they also have served as prior art to 
 
28. Id. at 323. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Biotechnology & Genomics, 
http://www.csrees.usda.gov/nea/biotech/biotech_all.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2009). 
32. Id. 
33. Tanuja V. Garde, Supporting Innovation in Targeted Treatments: Licenses of Right 
to NIH-Funded Research Tools, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 249, 273 (2005). 
34. Id. 
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block certain valuable inventions from attaining patent protection on 
the ground of obviousness.  In turn, these potentially valuable 
inventions may not be able to attract sufficient financial funding to 
move forward.  Without patent protection, potential funders for the 
inventions may withhold their funding for fear that the inventions would 
be copied by free-riders easily when the inventions become matured. 
 In addition, “[t]he ready availability of tools for finding a new 
biotechnology product does not change the high cost and uncertainty 
entailed in developing a marketable product using those tools.”35  Many 
patentable inventions in biotechnology spring from known components 
and methodologies found in the prior art.  Such combinations of prior 
art may be logical to try, but the advances “are only won through trial 
and error, at great effort and expense, and with only a low probability of 
success in achieving the claimed invention.”36  As the Biotechnology 
Industry Organization has argued in the amicus brief in KSR 
International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,37 “[r]esearch and development in the 
biotechnology industry is particularly expensive, time-consuming, and 
presents an unusually high-risk investment that relies on an objective 
and predictable application of obviousness law.”38 
 Nevertheless, 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) provides that “[p]atentability shall 
not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.”39  It 
is true that research tools, such as bioinformatics and DNA databases, 
have enhanced biotechnology research.  However, if the ease of a 
research process is taken into account in a negative sense to counteract 
the finding of non-obviousness, then the length of time, the amount of 
money, or the quality and quantity of human resources devoted to a 
certain invention should be taken into account in a positive sense for the 
finding of non-obviousness. 
 Biotechnology shares the common characteristics of pharmaceutical 
industry and DNA research.  The long development and testing lead 
time characteristic of pharmaceuticals can also be found in DNA-
related innovation.40  As commentators have observed, “[i]f any 
technology fits the criteria of high-cost, high-risk innovation, it is 
 
35. Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1678. 
36. Brief for Biotechnology Industry Organization as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 2, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (No. 04–1350). 
37. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
38. Amicus Curiae Brief for Biotechnology Industry Organization at 8, KSR Int’l Co. 
v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (No. 04-1350). 
39. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000). 
40. Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1624–25. 
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certainly biotechnology.”41 
 The patent law has been perceived by some as conflicting with the 
traditional norms of sharing in the field of biotechnology research.42  
Nevertheless, the norm may be changing or has been changed when 
modern biotechnology in general is no longer confined in basic research 
but focusing on how to reduce to practice and benefit the public.  
“[I]nnovation in the biomedical fields, while critical to human health, 
also poses concerns for health and safety until the long-term effects of 
new drugs can be determined.”43  The underlying policy is best 
illustrated in the statement made by the Legal Board of Appeal of the 
EPO in T1020/03, which reads: 
 
It is the very responsible task of physicians to treat their patients 
according to the best method known to the physician, and the 
more well-established the method is the more certain the 
physician can be of its success.  However the knowledge as to the 
best treatments has to be gained somehow, from in vitro tests, in 
vivo tests on cells and animals, and clinical trials under specially 
supervised conditions.  This needs to be financed.44 
 
 Inventing a new drug or a biomedical product is only the beginning 
of the process, not the end.45  Industries that must spend more time and 
money in research and development (“R&D”) generally have a greater 
need for patent protection.46  For instance, the R&D, drug design, and 
testing of a new drug in the pharmaceutical industry can take a decade 
or more and cost hundreds of millions of dollars.47  Moreover, the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) requires a lengthy and rigorous set of 
tests before companies can release drugs or biotechnology medications 
to the market.48  It makes the already expensive process even more 
costly. 
 As Professor Merges has proposed, obviousness or non-obviousness 
 
41. Id. at 1676. 
42. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in 
Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 184–85 (1987). 
43. Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1588. 
44. T1020/03 Genentech Inc./Method of Administration of IGF-I [EPO (Legal Bd. 
App.)], [2006] E.P.O.R. 9: 67, 93. 
45. Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1616. 
46. Id. at 1583. 
47. Id. at 1581. 
48. Id. at 1616. 
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should be viewed as a function of uncertainty.49  Where uncertainty is 
high, courts should moderately lower the standard of patentability to 
compensate for the risk of failure.50  Under the theory, uncertain and 
high-cost innovation, especially for those which are very expensive in 
the early stages, should more likely be entitled to a determination of 
non-obviousness.51 
 The Federal Circuit has concluded that chemistry, pharmaceutical 
research, and biotechnology are inherently uncertain disciplines.52  In 
addition to Professor Merges’s uncertainty-based view of obviousness,53 
commentators have also suggested that, if patents are to drive 
innovation in biotechnology, rather than merely invention, courts must 
take account of the cost and uncertainty of post-invention testing and 
development.54  “Where commonalities within an industry can be 
identified, tailoring may sometimes be best accomplished via judicial 
application of a bright-line rule.”55  This led to the proposal of judge-
made industry-specific standards of patentability.56 
 Though commentators suggested that “a fairly high obviousness 
threshold coupled with a fairly low disclosure requirement will produce 
a few very powerful patents in uncertain industries,”57 a lower disclosure 
requirement may impede biotechnology research and use to a greater 
extent than the benefit brought about by granting fewer patents.  
Specifically, lowering the disclosure requirement for biotechnology 
inventions would frustrate non-infringing use, such as the “medical 
practice exemption” under 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)58 and the so-called “FDA 
 
49. See Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. 
L.J. 1 (1992). 
50. Id. at 4. 
51. Id. at 69. 
52. See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1208–09 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (finding that biotechnology is an uncertain discipline); Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 
1655. 
53. Merges, supra note 49, at 3. 
54. Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1678. 
55. Id. at 1639. 
56. Id. at 1696. 
57. Id. at 1682. 
58. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) provides that: 
With respect to a medical practitioner’s performance of a medical activity that 
constitutes an infringement under section 271(a) or (b) of this title, the provisions of 
sections 281, 283, 284, and 285 of this title shall not apply against the medical 
practitioner or against a related health care entity with respect to such medical 
activity. 
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exemption” under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).59 
 Lowering the high disclosure requirement would increase the 
burden of a non-infringing user in acquiring additional information, 
namely the know-how,60 for an effective use regardless of whether the 
patent for that invention is granted.  Biotechnology research, as well as 
the use of biotechnology, requires a high demand of precision.  High 
precision in operating such technology generally relies on a high 
disclosure requirement in the prior art.  Lowering the disclosure 
requirement would provide inventors incentive to retain more “know-
how.”  Without first acquiring such information from the inventor, non-
infringing use would be unlikely if the high disclosure requirement is 
removed.  It would essentially grant inventors more leverage to hinder 
legitimate use by others. 
 As evidenced by the study of point mutation61 or single mutation,62 
one single nucleotide or amino acid missing or misplaced at a critical site 
may cause reading-frame shifting, drastic loss of specificity, or change of 
characteristic in the resulting DNA, RNA, or protein.  When a non-
infringing use becomes too burdensome, it essentially renders the 
statutory exemption meaningless.  Thus, lowering the disclosure 
requirement, even just exempting one single nucleotide or amino acid 
from disclosure, would be enough to cripple the existing statutory 
exemptions. 
 Moreover, unlike “obvious to try” as an indicator of “obviousness” 
 
59. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) provides that: 
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the 
United States or import into the United States a patented invention (other than a 
new animal drug or veterinary biological product (as those terms are used in the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913)) . . . solely for 
uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a 
Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.  
60. See BRIAN G. BRUNSVOLD ET AL., DRAFTING PATENT LICENSE AGREEMENTS 
193 (BNA Books 2008) (1971). 
61. Point mutation is defined as “[a] single nucleotide base change in the DNA.  A 
point mutation may consist of the loss of a nucleotide, the insertion of an additional 
nucleotide, or the substitution of one nucleotide for another.”  MedicineNet.com, Definition 
of Point Mutation, http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=4968 (last visited 
Feb. 17, 2009).  A classical example of human diseases caused by a point mutation is sickle 
cell anemia.  See id. 
62. For example, a single amino acid substitution in N1 nuraminidase of human 
influenza virus confers the virus high level drug resistance to oseltamivir. World Health Org., 
Influenza A (H1N1) Virus Resistance to Oseltamivir, available at 
http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:VXLj600kE1oJ:www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/oselta
mivir_summary/en/index.html+single+mutation&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=4&gl=us (last visited 
Feb. 17, 2009). 
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in other disciplines, “obvious to try” is an anomaly in the 
biotechnological and pharmaceutical contexts.  Because of the high 
costs of biotechnology and pharmaceutical research, a research proposal 
is unlikely to receive grants or any sort of financial support without the 
projection of a “reasonable expectation of success.”  Nevertheless, a 
documented “reasonable expectation of success” would render an 
invention “obvious to try” under a “one-size-for-all” obviousness 
standard.  As a result, only very few, if any, biotechnology or 
pharmaceutical inventions can escape from the suspicion of “obvious to 
try” if the nature of the industry and the characteristic of the technology 
is not taken into consideration. 
 As a result, the judge-made industry-specific obviousness standard 
for biotechnology medication and pharmaceutical inventions suggested 
in the thesis is referred to as a lower obviousness threshold coupled with 
a high disclosure requirement.  Before turning the focus of this Article 
to the American patent system, Part IV first examines how other major 
patent systems have approached the issue of obviousness, especially in 
the biotechnological and pharmaceutical contexts.  Specifically, the 
Canadian system may be deemed as an example of the judge-made 
industry-specific approach, though this approach is traceable to English 
case law. 
IV.  OBVIOUSNESS IN OTHER PATENT SYSTEMS 
 The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has extensive jurisdiction 
over patent-law claims in which district courts would have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).63  Because of the lack of competing circuits in 
adjudicating patent issues, including obviousness, a comparative study 
among other major patent systems may have some value before 
discussing the obviousness jurisprudence in the United States. 
 The obviousness examinations in major patent systems may be 
sorted into three basic categories.  The first category is a rigid step-by-
step analysis, as exemplified by the EPO practice.  The second type is a 
judge-made industry-specific approach, as exemplified by the Canadian 
common law.  The third approach is a higher obviousness standard 
supplemented with a less stringent utility model protection as a safety 
net, as represented by the German patent system. 
 Nevertheless, some patent systems choose to adopt certain features 
 
63.  E.g., Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 834 
(2002);  28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)(2007) (providing “[t]he district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patent”). 
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from different models and thus signify the compromise among different 
models.  The obviousness tests adopted in the United Kingdom and 
Japan are step-by-step analysis but they are not as rigid as the EPO 
approach.  It is interesting to note that the Chinese patent system has 
adopted an agency-generated industry-specific obviousness standard for 
chemical compounds and biotechnology inventions, although judges are 
not allowed to make law under its current political and legal system.  In 
addition to China, Japan represents another civil law system that has 
adopted industry-specific inventive-step rules for biotechnology 
inventions. 
A.  The Practice of the European Patent Office 
 The analysis of obviousness in the EPO’s practice is a rigid step-by-
step approach.64  It is called the problem-and-solution approach.65  This 
approach is a means to show that an invention is lacking an inventive 
step “by demonstrating the existence of an obvious route” between the 
closest prior art and the claimed invention.66  The goal of this approach 
is to assess inventive step in an objective and predictable manner.67 
 “Inventive step” is the European equivalent of “non-obviousness.”  
Article 56 of the European Patent Convention provides that “[a]n 
invention shall be considered as involving an inventive step if, having 
regard to the state of the art, it is not obvious to a person skilled in the 
art.”68  As non-obviousness, inventive step is a requirement of 
patentability. 
 The problem-and-solution approach is essentially comprised of 
three steps:69 (i) determining the “closest prior art”;70 (ii) establishing the 
“objective technical problem” to be solved;71 and (iii) considering 
whether or not the claimed invention, starting from the closest prior art 
and the objective technical problem, would have been obvious to the 
 
64. See George S.A. Szabo, The Problem and Solution Approach in the European 
Patent Office, 4 I.I.C. 457, 458 (1995). 
65. Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, pt. C, ch. IV, § 11.7. 
(European Patent Office, Dec. 2007). 
66. Szabo, supra note 64, at 458. 
67. Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, supra note 65, pt. C, ch. 
IV, § 11.7. 
68. European Patent Convention art. 56, Oct. 10, 1973, revised Dec. 13, 2007. 
69. Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, supra note 65, pt. C, ch. 
IV, § 11.7. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
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skilled person.72 
 First, the closest prior art is a single reference, which constitutes the 
most promising starting point for an obvious development leading to the 
claimed invention.73  Contrary to the doctrine of inherency in U.S. 
practice, as George S.A. Szabo has explained, the recognizable content 
of the closest prior art should not include hidden properties which the 
skilled person cannot be aware of.74  In practice, the closest prior art is 
selected from references which correspond to a similar use and require 
the minimum of structural and functional modifications to arrive at the 
claimed invention.75  The closest prior art being selected may be 
different from the prior art of which the applicant was actually aware at 
the time the application was filed.76 
 Combination of other references with the closest prior art is 
permissible.77  However, “the fact that more than one disclosure must be 
combined with the closest prior art in order to arrive at a combination 
of features may be the sign of the presence of an inventive step.”78 
 Second, the objective technical problem in the problem-and-
solution approach context “means the aim and task of modifying or 
adapting the closest prior art to provide the technical effects that the 
invention provides over the closest prior art.”79  In formulating the 
problem, one should study the patent application, the closest prior art, 
and identify their difference.80  The difference is also called “the 
distinguishing features” of the invention.81  The distinguishing features 
between the invention and the closest prior art can be either structural 
or functional.82 
 In order to avoid hindsight judgment, the objective technical 
problem must not contain any pointer to the technical solution offered 
 
72. Id. 
73. Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, supra note 65, pt. C, ch. 
IV, § 11.7.1.  The single reference being selected “should be directed to a similar purpose or 
effect as the invention or at least belong to the same or a closely related technical field as the 
claimed invention.” Id. 
74. Szabo, supra note 64, at 463. 
75. Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, supra note 65, pt. C, ch. 
IV, § 11.7.1. 
76. Id. § 11.7.2. 
77. Id. § 11.8. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. § 11.7.2. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
SU FINAL 5-17-10 5/19/2010  2:29 PM 
2010] WHAT ABOUT KNOW-HOW 335 
 
by the invention.83  In addition, the term “technical problem” does not 
suggest that the technical solution must be a technical improvement 
over the prior art.84  Thus, as George S.A. Szabo has explained, “all 
quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the result, attributable to 
the modifications of the prior art in question, should be given credit.”85  
On the other hand, where no problem at all can be recognized in the 
closest prior art, the consequence is that the claimed invention is 
necessarily non-obvious with respect to the closest prior art.86 
 In the final stage of analysis, it is specifically called the “could-
would approach.”87  This is another measure to avoid hindsight 
judgment in the analysis.  The key is to ask whether there is any 
teaching in the prior art as a whole that “would,” rather than just 
“could,” have prompted the skilled person, “faced with the objective 
technical problem, to modify or adapt the closest prior art while taking 
account of that teaching, thereby arriving at something falling within the 
terms of the claims, and thus achieving what the invention achieves.”88  
It is irrelevant to the analysis whether a skilled person “could” have 
done the same thing as the applicant. 
 In practice, the burden is on the EPO or with the opponent to prove 
that “a skilled person would have done so” and to refute the 
presumption of patent validity.89  As George S.A. Szabo has observed, 
this is contrary to the practice in the United States.90  In the United 
States, the possibility of “could” usually evokes a prima facie 
obviousness objection leaving the applicants with the difficult task of 
proving that “a skilled person would not have done the same.”91 
 The inventive-step test in the EPO practice is a rigid step-by-step 
analysis.  It is carefully crafted to avoid hindsight judgment, which is 
often stated as “a skilled person could have done the same.”  Though 
Germany is a signatory state of the European Patent Convention 
(EPC), some have observed that the inventive-step standard in the 
 
83. Id. 
84. Id.  “[T]he problem could be simply to seek an alternative to a known device or 
process providing the same or similar effects or which is more cost-effective.” Id. 
85. Szabo, supra note 64, at 466. 
86. Id. 
87. Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, supra note 65, pt. C, ch. 
IV, § 11.7.3. 
88. Id. 
89. Szabo, supra note 64, at 475. 
90. Id. 
91. Szabo, supra note 64, at 475. 
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German patent system may be higher than the EPO practice due to 
procedural reasons.  Nevertheless, the German utility model system has 
provided sufficient protection to inventions which possess relatively 
minor inventive steps. 
B.  Obviousness in Germany 
 Germany had abandoned the requirement of “technical progress,” 
which was considered a higher standard of obviousness, after its 
harmonization with the European patent system.92  However, some have 
observed that the concept of “technical progress” continued to affect 
the German courts’ determination of inventive step or obviousness at 
least in certain cases.93  Alternatively, others have suggested that the 
difference of inventive step between the German patent system and the 
EPO practice, if any, is due to the accessibility and the different weight 
given to evidence such as prior art94 or secondary consideration.95  
Nevertheless, a higher standard of obviousness can be justified under 
the German patent system because in difficult cases, such as the second 
medical indication of a pharmaceutical, the utility model protection may 
be available.96 
 Though “technical progress” is no longer a prerequisite of 
patentability under the German patent system, the German Federal 
Supreme Court in Trigonellin stressed that, it should not be the purpose 
of patent law to protect and encourage nonsense.97  Under the European 
patent system, national courts are bound by the EPO and the 
Implementation Regulation but not the Examination Guidelines.98  As 
Alfred Keukenschrijver has observed, the German Federal Patent 
Court is often dissatisfied with the level of inventive step that the EPO 
 
92. Beier, supra note 10, at 323. 
93. Alfred Keukenschrijver, European Patents with Effect for Germany in the Light of 
Recent Federal Supreme Court Decisions, 7 I.I.C. 711, 720 (2003). 
94. See, e.g., id. at 711; Rüdiger Rogge, The Revocation of European Patents in 
Germany, 2 I.I.C. 217 (1996). 
95. See Jochen Pagenberg, Different Level of Inventive Step for German and European 
Patents? The Present Practice of Nullity Proceedings in Germany, 6 I.I.C. 763 (1991) 
[hereinafter Pagenberg, Different Level]. 
96. Dieter R. Schneider, Patenting of Pharmaceuticals—Still a Challenge?, 5 I.I.C. 511, 
518–19 (2008). 
97. Keukenschrijver, supra note 93, at 720. The German Federal Supreme Court’s 
Trigonellin decision was issued in 2001. Id. at 719; Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court 
of Justice] 2001, 147 Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht [GRUR] 730 (F.R.G). 
98. Id. at 714. 
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applies.99  However, after examination of twenty-nine decisions 
rendered by the German Federal Supreme Court from 1996 to 2000, he 
concluded that, at least statistically, there is no proof that the German 
Federal Supreme Court has a hostile attitude towards European 
patents.100  If the German courts evaluate the inventive step differently 
from the EPO, it was suggested that it may arise from two possibilities, 
namely the admissibility of evidence101 and the different weight given to 
secondary considerations.102 
 First, the German procedural law has adopted “the principle of the 
unrestricted assessment of evidence,” while only documented and 
published evidence is admissible in the EPO practice.103  Therefore, the 
discrepancy between the German courts and the EPO concerning the 
problem-and-solution-approach may arise from the definition of the 
person skilled in the art resulting from different sources of evidence.104  
For instance, the EPO has criticized the German Federal Supreme 
Court for imposing a high level of specialist skills without citing any 
published evidence in certain cases.105 
 Second, it was suggested that the weight given to secondary 
considerations may have affected the determination of inventive step in 
the German patent system, but it was inconclusive.  It has long been 
debated that various German courts have weighed secondary 
considerations differently.106  However, it is inconclusive whether this 
factor, if it exists, has affected the inventive-step standard in the 
German patent system. 
 Though the German patent system has arguably adopted a higher 
inventive-step standard compared to the EPO practice, the German 
utility model system has served as a safety net providing sufficient 
 
99. Id. at 713. 
100. Id. 
101. See, e.g., id. at 711 (2003); Rogge, supra note 94.  
102. See, e.g., Jochen Pagenberg, Examination for Nonobviousness—A Critical 
Comment on German Patent Practice, 1 I.I.C. 1 (1981) [hereinafter Pagenberg, A Critical 
Comment]; Ernst K. Pakuscher, Examination for Nonobviousness—A Response, 6 I.I.C. 816 
(1981); Jochen Pagenberg, Examination for Nonobviousness—Concluding Observations, 6 
I.I.C. 824 (1981) [hereinafter Pagenberg, Concluding Observations]; Pagenberg, Different 
Level, supra note 95. 
103. Keukenschrijver, supra note 93, at 715. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 718. 
106. See, e.g., Pagenberg, A Critical Comment, supra note 102; Pakuscher supra note 
102; Pagenberg, Concluding Observations, supra note 102; Pagenberg, Different Level, supra 
note 95, at 763. 
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protection to inventions which possess relatively minor inventive step.  
For instance, under German law, processes are generally excluded from 
utility model protection and “uses” are regarded as a form of 
processes.107  Nevertheless, in difficult cases, such as the second medical 
indication of a pharmaceutical, the German Federal Supreme Court in 
Arzneimittelgebrauchsmuster stated that the use of a pharmaceutical is 
more closely linked to a substance than to a process.108  Therefore utility 
model protection is possible.109 
 A higher obviousness standard under the German patent system 
can be justified because the utility model protection has served as a 
safety net for inventions in which the inventive step is difficult to 
evaluate.  Like Germany, the United Kingdom is under an obligation to 
harmonize its patent system with its European counterparts.  However, 
unlike Germany, the United Kingdom has its common law tradition, 
which is distinct from the civil law systems on the European continent.  
Under a common law system, the evolution of law primarily rests in the 
courts. 
C.  Obviousness in the United Kingdom 
 The inventive-step analysis in the United Kingdom is flexible in that 
it has taken specific categories of inventions, such as chemical class 
claim, and the high-tech nature of an invention into account.  In a recent 
case reviewed by the English House of Lords, Lord Walker of 
Gestingthorpe has stated that a precedent decided more than four 
decades ago may not be applicable to a case concerning modern 
technology which did not even exist when the precedent was decided.  
Specifically, an “obvious to try” rationale stemming from a low-tech 
process may not be applicable to a high-tech context. 
 The English Court of Appeal first established its inventive-step test 
in Windsurfing International, Inc. v. Tabur Marine, Ltd.110  In 2007, the 
 
107. Schneider, supra note 96, at 519. 
108. Id. at 518; Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Oct. 5, 2005, 
Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz and Urheberrecht [GRUR] 135, 136 (F.R.G.). 
109. Id. at 519. 
110. Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. Tabur Marine, Ltd., [1985] R.P.C. 59, 73–74 (C.A.) (Civ. 
Div.).  The original test includes four steps: 
The first is to identify the inventive concept embodied in the patent in suit. 
Thereafter, the court has to assume the mantle of the normally skilled but 
unimaginative addressee in the art at the priority date and to impute to him what 
was, at that date, common general knowledge in the art in question. The third step is 
to identify what, if any, differences exist between the matter cited as being “known 
or used” and the alleged invention. Finally, the court has to ask itself whether, 
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English Court of Appeal modified and restated the Windsurfing test in 
Pozzoli SPA v. BDMO SA.111  The court summarized the restated 
Windsurfing test as the following: 
 
(1)  (a) Identify the notional “person skilled in the art”  
  (b) Identify the relevant common general knowledge of that 
person; 
(2) Identify the inventive concept of the claim in question or if 
that cannot readily be done, construe it;  
(3) Identify what, if any, differences exist between the matter 
cited as forming part of the ‘state of the art’ and the inventive 
concept of the claim or the claim as construed;  
(4) Viewed without any knowledge of the alleged invention as 
claimed, do those differences constitute steps which would have 
been obvious to the person skilled in the art or do they require 
any degree of invention?112 
 
 Before indentifying the inventive concept of a claim, there should 
be claim construction to find out what the claim means.113  In principle, 
the inventive concept should be derived from the claim in question, 
rather than some generalized concept derived from the specification as a 
whole.114  However, the principle is not so wooden.115  The Pozzoli court 
acknowledged that it may be impractical to identify the inventive 
concept in certain cases, such as a chemical class claims.116  After all, 
“[i]n the end what matters is/are the difference(s) between what is 
claimed and the prior art.”117 
 In 2008, the House of Lords reaffirmed that the question of 
obviousness should be determined by reference to the claim in issue, 
rather than some vague paraphrase based upon the extent of the 
disclosure in the description.118  In Conor Medsystems, Inc. v. Angiotech 
 
viewed without any knowledge of the alleged invention, those differences constitute 
steps which would have been obvious to the skilled man or whether they require any 
degree of invention.  
Id. 
111. Pozzoli SPA v. BDMO SA, [2007] EWCA Civ 588. 
112. Id. ¶ 23. 
113. Id. ¶ 17. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. ¶ 20. 
117. Id. ¶ 19. 
118. Conor Medsystems, Inc. v. Angiotech  Pharms., Inc., [2008] UKHL 49, ¶ 19. 
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Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Lord Hoffmann rebuffed the challenger’s 
argument as “watering down the claimed invention by reference to what 
[the challenger] said were inadequacies in the specification.”119 
 The English patent system has long recognized that an “obvious to 
try” test can be relevant in an obviousness inquiry.  However, the House 
of Lords also recognized that the “obvious to try” test has its limitation.  
In Conor Medsystems, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe cautioned about 
being trapped into the anomaly of “obvious to try” in his separate 
opinion.120  Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe restated the observation 
made by the EPO concerning obvious to try: 
 
If the reward for finding a solution to a problem and securing a 
monopoly for that solution is very high, then it may well be 
worthwhile for large players to examine all potential avenues to 
see if one gives the right result, even though the prospects of any 
one of them succeeding are much less than 50/50. What makes 
something worth trying is the outcome of a simple risk to reward 
calculation. Yet, if the reward is very large, the avenues worth 
trying will be expanded accordingly. So, the more commercially 
attractive the solution and the more pressing the public clamour 
for it, the harder it will be to avoid an obviousness attack.121 
 
  As Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe has stated, the English precedent122 
establishing the rationale of “obvious to try” was decided more than 
four decades ago, and that case was concerned with a fairly low-tech 
process.123  During the last forty years, the volume of biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical research has increased enormously.124  The potential 
rewards in worldwide markets are great and the competition is fierce.125  
“In this climate ‘obvious to try’ has tended to take on a life of its own as 
an important weapon in the armory of those challenging the validity of a 
patent.”126  Quoting from Sir Hugh Laddie, Lord Walker of 
Gestingthorpe restated that “as technology advances rapidly, this is a 
serious and growing problem.”127 
 
119. Id. 
120. Id. ¶¶ 45–48. 
121. Id. ¶ 48. 
122. Johns-Manville Corporation’s Patent, [1967] R.P.C. 479. 
123. Conor Medsystems, Inc., UKHL 49, ¶ 47. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. ¶ 48. 
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 Recent opinions of the English courts have suggested a trend of an 
industry-specific obviousness analysis for the biotechnology medications 
or pharmaceuticals, though the underlying reason may be, at least in 
part, due to the English patent system’s obligation as a signatory state of 
the EPC in harmonizing with its European counterparts.  As technology 
advances, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe in the English House of Lords 
has opined that a precedent decided more than four decades ago may 
not be applicable to a case concerning modern technology which did not 
even exist when the precedent was decided.128  Moreover, an “obvious to 
try” rationale stemming from a low-tech process may not be applicable 
to a high-tech context.  On the other hand, the Canadian patent system 
is an example which has elected an industry-specific approach without a 
mandate to harmonize with other patent systems. 
D.  Obviousness in Canada 
 The Canadian patent system has essentially adopted a judge-made 
industry-specific obviousness standard, at least for pharmaceutical 
inventions.  This approach, as exemplified by the selection patent 
doctrine, has a root traceable to the English case law.  In a recent case 
reviewed by the Canadian Supreme Court, the Court further interpreted 
“obvious to try” as a high burden of proof if a challenger chooses to 
argue on this ground. 
 The Canadian obviousness jurisprudence was first enunciated by the 
Federal Court of Canada, Appellate Division, in Beloit Canada Ltd. v. 
Valmet Oy.129  It was later adopted by the Canadian Supreme Court in 
Whirlpool Corp. v. Camco, Inc.130 
 The Beloit court started its analysis by defining what a technician 
skilled in the art would possess.131  In the Beloit court’s view, for the 
purpose of determining obviousness, a technician skilled in the art 
should possess “no scintilla of inventiveness or imagination.”132  In other 
words, the hypothetical technician skilled in the art must be 
unimaginative.133 
 
 128.   Conor Medsystems, Inc. UKHL 49, ¶ 47. 
129. Beloit Canada, Ltd.  v. Valmet Oy, [1986], 8 C.P.R. (3d) 289 (Fed. C.A.). 
130. Whirlpool Corp. v. Camco, Inc., [2000] 9 C.P.R. (4th) 129, ¶ 49 (S.C.C.); see also, 
e.g. Procter & Gamble Pharms. Canada, Inc. v. Canada, [2004], 37 C.P.R. (4th) 289, ¶ 45 
(Fed. C.A.). 
131. Beloit Canada, 8 C.P.R. (3d) 289, ¶ 17. 
132. Id. 
133. Apotex, Inc. v. Wellcome Found., Ltd., [2000], 10 C.P.R. (4th) 65, ¶ 63 (Fed. 
C.A.). 
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 The court stressed that non-obviousness is “a very difficult test to 
satisfy.”134  The question in an obviousness analysis to be asked is 
whether a technician skilled in the art “would, in the light of the state of 
the art and of common general knowledge as at the claimed date of 
invention, have come directly and without difficulty to the solution 
taught by the patent.”135 
 In addition, the Beloit court expressed its caution about the 
adoption of expert testimony in the determination of obviousness.  In 
the court’s view, expert testimony is admissible even on “an ‘ultimate 
issue’ question such as obviousness.”136  However, it must be treated 
with extreme care,137 because “[e]very invention is obvious after it has 
been made, and to no one more so than an expert in the field.”138  
“Where the expert has been hired for the purpose of testifying, his 
infallible hindsight is even more suspect.”139  Therefore, before an 
expert’s assertion can be given any weight, the expert must have a 
satisfactory answer to the question, “Why didn’t you do it if it is so 
easy?”140 
 It is worth noting that the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal has 
extended the selection patent doctrine to the selection between two 
isomers of a racemate141 in Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada, Inc. v. Apotex, 
 
134. Beloit Canada, 8 C.P.R. (3d) 289, ¶ 17. 
The classical touchstone for obviousness is the technician skilled in the art but 
having no scintilla of inventiveness or imagination; a paragon of deduction and 
dexterity, wholly devoid of intuition; a triumph of the left hemisphere over the right. 
The question to be asked is whether this mythical creature (the man in the Clapham 
omnibus of patent law) would, in the light of the state of the art and of common 
general knowledge as at the claimed date of invention, have come directly and 
without difficulty to the solution taught by the patent. It is a very difficult test to 
satisfy. 
 Id. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. ¶ 20. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. ¶ 21. 
Every invention is obvious after it has been made, and to no one more so than an 
expert in the field. Where the expert has been hired for the purpose of testifying, his 
infallible hindsight is even more suspect. It is so easy, once the teaching of a patent 
is known, to say, “I could have done that”; before the assertion can be given any 
weight, one must have a satisfactory answer to the question, “Why didn’t you?” 
Id. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. A racemate is a substance containing equal amounts of two optical isomers, 
known as the dextro-rotatory isomer (also known as the d enantiomer, and represented by 
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Inc.142 in 2006.  The selection patent rationale was established in Pfizer 
Canada, Inc. v. Canada143 in the same year. 
 The court in Pfizer Canada, Inc. identified two general classes of 
chemical patents.144  They are the originating patent and selection 
patent.145  The former is referring to “an originating invention involving 
the discovery of a new reaction or a new compound.”146  The latter is 
referring to “a selection from related compounds derived from the 
original compound and which have been described in general terms and 
claimed in the originating patent.”147 
 It is immaterial whether a selection patent is claimed for a selection 
from a class of thousands or for a selection of one out of two.148  The 
Canadian Federal Court of Appeal referred to English case law and 
stated that “the ‘inventive step in a selection patent lies in the discovery 
that one or more members of a previously known class of products 
possess some special advantage for a particular purpose which could not 
be predicted before the discovery was made.’”149  The policy behind the 
selection patent doctrine is “to encourage researchers to further use 
their inventive skills so as to discover new advantages for compounds 
within the known class.”150 
 However, “[a]ll claimed members of the known class must have the 
advantage and the advantage must not be one that those skilled in the 
art would expect to find in a large number of the previously disclosed 
class.”151  The Canadian Federal Court of Appeal in a later case 
rephrased the requirement that “the validity of [a selection patent] 
depends on it having unexpected advantages over the class from which 
it is selected.”152  In other words, “[n]o one can claim a selection patent 
merely for ascertaining the properties of a known substance.”153 
 The Canadian Federal Court of Appeal in Sanofi-Synthelabo 
 
[+]) and the levo-rotatory isomer (also known as the l enantiomer, and represented by [-]). 
Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc. [2006], 59 C.P.R. (4th) 46, ¶ 4 (Fed. C.A.). 
142. Id. 
143. Pfizer Canada, Inc. v. Canada, [2006], 52 C.P.R. (4th) 241 (Fed. C.A.). 
144. Id. ¶ 3. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. ¶ 5. 
149. Id. ¶ 4. 
150. Id. ¶ 5. 
151. Id. ¶ 4. 
152. Id. ¶ 69. 
153. Id. ¶ 24. 
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Canada, Inc. affirmed the trial judge’s finding that a selection patent 
claimed for a selection of one isomer out of two may meet the threshold 
of non-obviousness.154  In Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada, Inc., the prior-art 
patent specifically identified twenty-one individual racemates, including 
the racemate from which the separated isomers were obtained in the 
patent at issue.155  However, the court agreed with the trial judge’s 
finding that  
 
there is no teaching on how to separate the racemates 
into their isomers, and no mention or suggestion [in the 
prior art] that there are any pharmaceutical or 
toxicological differences between the isomers of the 
disclosed racemates with respect to activity or 
tolerability.156   
 
Though the separation technique was well-known, it “had to be tried 
with uncertainty as to which would actually result in a successful 
separation.”157  Therefore, a selection patent claimed for a selection of 
one isomer out of two may satisfy the requirement of non-
obviousness.158 
 On appeal to the Canadian Supreme Court, the Court again 
affirmed the appellate court judge’s finding and stated that the finding 
was unaffected by the lower court’s rejection of the “obvious to try” 
test.159  The Canadian Supreme Court sought advice from the English 
Windsurfing test,160 as restated by the English Court of Appeal in 2007,161 
in analyzing a potential “obvious to try” situation where the Canadian 
Beloit test162 would not accommodate.163  The question to be asked in the 
fourth step of the Windsurfing test is that “[v]iewed without any 
knowledge of the alleged invention as claimed, do those differences 
 
154. See Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada, Inc., 59 C.P.R. (4th) 46, ¶ 44. 
155. Id. ¶ 9. 
156. Id. ¶ 10. 
157. Id. ¶ 42. 
158. See id. ¶ 44. 
159. Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., [2008] 69 C.P.R. (4th) 251, ¶ 72 
(Can.). 
160. Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. Tabur Marine, Ltd., [1985] R.P.C. 59, 73–74 (C.A.) (Civ. 
Div.). 
161. Pozzoli SPA v. BDMO SA, [2007] EWCA Civ. 588, ¶ 23. 
162. Beloit Canada, Ltd. v. Valmet Oy, [1986], 8 C.P.R. (3d) 289, ¶ 17 (Fed. C.A.). 
163. Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada, Inc., 69 C.P.R. (4th) 251, ¶¶ 52, 60, 67. 
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constitute steps which would have been obvious to the person skilled in 
the art or do they require any degree of invention?”164  In applying the 
test, the Canadian Supreme Court stated that it is “the fourth step of the 
Windsurfing/Pozzoli approach to obviousness that the issue of ‘obvious 
to try’ will arise.”165 
 Before conducting an “obvious to try” analysis, a court needs to 
determine whether the analysis is warranted in such a situation.166  In 
situations where an “obvious to try” analysis is warranted, the Canadian 
Supreme Court suggested a list of factors that a court should take into 
consideration at the fourth step of the obviousness inquiry.167 
 In particular, unlike the American approach,168 the Canadian 
Supreme Court stated that there should be “no reason to exclude 
evidence of the history of the invention, particularly where the 
knowledge of those involved in finding the invention is no lower than 
what would be expected of the skilled person.”169  “[W]here those 
involved including the inventor and his or her team were highly skilled 
in the particular technology involved, the evidence may suggest that the 
skilled person would have done a lot worse and would not likely have 
managed to find the invention.”170  In such a situation, the inventors’ 
course of conduct would suggest that it would not have been obvious for 
a skilled person to try the course that led to the invention.171 
 Moreover, the Canadian Supreme Court has noted that “obvious to 
 
164. Id. ¶ 67. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. ¶ 68.  An “obvious to try” analysis might be appropriate in areas where 
advances are often won by experimentation. Id.  A pharmaceutical invention might warrant 
an “obvious to try” analysis where “there may be many chemically similar structures that can 
elicit different biological responses and offer the potential for significant therapeutic 
advances.” Id. 
167. Id. ¶ 69.  The Court cautioned that this is not an exhaustive list: 
(1) Is it more or less self-evident that what is being tried ought to work? Are there a 
finite number of identified predictable solutions known to persons skilled in the art? 
(2) What is the extent, nature and amount of effort required to achieve the 
invention? Are routine trials carried out or is the experimentation prolonged and 
arduous, such that the trials would not be considered routine? 
(3) Is there a motive provided in the prior art to find the solution the patent 
addresses?  
Id. 
168. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). 
169. Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada, Inc., 69 C.P.R. (4th) 251, ¶ 70. 
170. Id. ¶ 71. 
171. Id. 
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try” is not a mandatory test.172  Whether it is a factor to be considered 
depends on the context and the nature of the invention.173  Most 
importantly, “obvious to try” “is not a panacea for alleged infringers.”174  
As the Court has stated, “[t]he patent system is intended to provide an 
economic encouragement for research and development.”175  “It is well 
known that this is particularly important in the field of pharmaceuticals 
and biotechnology.”176 
 Before finding an invention “obvious to try,” “there must be 
evidence to convince a judge on a balance of probabilities that it was 
more or less self-evident to try to obtain the invention.”177  As a result, 
the Canadian Supreme Court has interpreted the “obvious to try” test 
as a high standard to meet if the challenger of patent validity chooses to 
argue on this ground. 
 The Canadian obviousness jurisprudence represents an industry-
specific approach, which has taken the specific characteristic of the 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries into account, specifically 
the adoption of the selection patent doctrine and the expansion of such 
doctrine to the selection between two isomers.  Though the Canadian 
Supreme Court has adopted the “obvious to try” rationale from English 
case law, the Court has interpreted “obvious to try” as a high standard.  
Unlike Canada or the United Kingdom, judges in countries which have 
a civil law tradition cannot make law.  Alternatively, certain countries 
provide industry-specific obviousness standard in their Patent 
Examination Guidelines.  China and Japan are two examples. 
E.  Obviousness in China 
 The obviousness analysis under the Chinese patent system possesses 
two distinct features.  On the one hand, the Chinese patent system has 
adopted the European problem-and-solution approach in general.  On 
the other hand, the Chinese patent office provides special obviousness 
rules for chemical compound and biotechnology inventions.  Therefore, 
its obviousness standard retains certain industry-specific features as seen 
in the Canadian or English patent system, though judges cannot make 
law under the Chinese legal and political system. 
 
172. Id. ¶ 62. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. ¶¶ 62, 64. 
175. Id. ¶ 64. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. ¶ 66.  The mere possibility that something might turn up is not enough to find 
“obvious to try.” Id. 
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 Inventiveness is one of the patentability requirements in addition to 
novelty and practical applicability under Chinese Patent Law.178  The 
inventiveness requirement applies to both the invention179 and utility 
models,180 although the definitions of inventiveness differ.181  For the 
purposes of patent application, inventiveness means that, as compared 
with the technology existing before the date of filing, the invention has 
“prominent substantive features” and represents a “notable progress.”182  
For the purposes of utility-model application, the utility model should 
possess “substantive features” and represent “progress.”183 
 The so called “prominent substantive features” is the Chinese 
equivalent of “non-obviousness.”184  All inventions that have prominent 
substantive features would automatically fall into one of the four 
circumstances listed in the Guideline for Examination, and therefore 
meet the “notable progress” requirement.185  No additional inquiry is 
needed.  Moreover, despite the differences in statutory language, the 
Chinese patent system has essentially adopted the same problem-and-
 
178. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China, ch. II, art. 22 (2000). 
179. “Invention” in the Chinese Patent Law means any new technical solution relating 
to a product, a process or improvement. Implementing Regulations of the Patent Law of the 
People’s Republic of China, ch.1, rule 2 (promulgated by the State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China on June 15, 2001, and effective as of July 1, 2001), available at 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/laws/lawsregulations/200203/t20020327_33871.htm (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2009). 
180. “Utility model” in the Chinese Patent Law means any new technical solution 
relating to the shape, the structure, or their combination, of a product, which is fit for 
practical use. Implementing Regulations of the Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China, 
ch.1, rule 2 (promulgated by the State Council of the People’s Republic of China on June 15, 
2001, and effective as of July 1, 2001), available at 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/laws/lawsregulations/200203/t20020327_33871.htm (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2009). 
181. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 177. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. Guanle Wu, How to Get a Patent in China, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY, available at 
http://www.managingip.com/Article/1321548/How%20to%20get%20a%20patent%20in%20
China.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2009). 
185. Id.  The four circumstances are (1) the invention produces a better technical effect 
compared with the prior art; (2) the invention provides a technical solution which has a 
different technical concept but has a technical effect substantially the same level as in the 
prior art; (3) the invention represents a new trend in the development of new technology; and 
(4) in certain aspects, the invention has some negative effects, but it has outstanding positive 
technical effect in other respects. Guideline for Examination, pt. II, ch. 4, §3.2.2 (State 
Intellectual Property Office of the People’s Republic of China, July 2006) (hereinafter 
Chinese Guideline for Examination). 
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solution approach in determining obviousness as the EPO.186 
 Unlike common law systems as exemplified by the United Kingdom 
or Canada, a judge-made industry-specific obviousness standard is 
unlikely to occur in China.187  Alternatively, the Chinese patent system 
has provided industry-specific obviousness standards for specific 
industries, such as chemistry and biotechnology, in the Guideline for 
Examination.188 
 As specifically provided in the Guideline, the inventive step of a 
compound should not be denied simply on the ground of structural 
similarity,189 unless it does not possess unexpected use or effect.190  
Before an examiner makes such a rejection, “[i]t is necessary to further 
explain that its use or effect can be expected or is predictable, or that a 
person skilled in the art is able to produce or use that compound by 
logical analysis, inference or limited experiment on the basis of the prior 
art.”191 
 In addition to chemical compounds, the Chinese Examination 
Guideline provides in great length the special rules for determining the 
inventive step of inventions relating to genetic engineering192 or 
microorganism.193  Under the category of inventions relating to genetic 
engineering, specific rules are provided for patent applications in which 
the claimed subject matter is gene, recombinant vector, transformant, 
fused cell, or monoclonal antibody respectively.194 
 Generally, “a person skilled in the art cannot expect” or 
“unexpected technical effects compared with the prior art” is required 
for a finding of inventive step for an invention relating to genetic 
engineering.195  Specifically, where the protein or the amino acid 
 
186.  Chinese Guideline for Examination § 3.2.1.1.  As provided in the Guideline for 
Examination, three steps are followed to determine whether a claimed invention is obvious as 
compared with the prior art: first, determining the closest prior art; second, determining the 
distinguishing features of the invention and the technical problem actually solved by the 
invention; and third, determining whether or not the claimed invention is obvious to a person 
skilled in the art.  Id. 
187. Under the Chinese Constitution, judicial decisions are subject to interference by 
legislatures, which exercise a supervisory function over the courts. Stanley Lubman, Looking 
for Law in China, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 30 (2006). 
188. Chinese Guideline for Examination, supra note 184, ch. 10. 
189. Id. § 6.1(4). 
190. Id. § 6.1(2). 
191. Id. § 6.1(4). 
192. Id. § 9.4.2.1. 
193. Id. § 9.4.2.2. 
194. Id. § 9.4.2.1(1)(5). 
195. Id. 
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sequence of the protein is known, if a claimed gene has a specific base 
sequence and has technical effects compared with other genes having a 
different base sequence encoding the same protein, which a person 
skilled in the art cannot expect, then the invention of the claimed gene 
involves an inventive step.196  The invention of a monoclonal antibody 
generally does not involve an inventive step, unless “the invention is 
further defined by other features, and hence has unexpected technical 
effects,” then the invention of that monoclonal antibody involves an 
inventive step.197 
 In patenting a microorganism itself, the minimal requirement is 
that, so long as the microorganism produces technical effects that 
cannot be expected by a person skilled in the art, it involves an inventive 
step.198  An invention relating to the use of a microorganism involves an 
inventive step if the microorganism used in the invention is remarkably 
different from a microorganism of known species with taxonomic 
characteristics, even if the use is the same as the prior art.199  Otherwise, 
there is no inventive step unless unexpected technical effects are 
found.200 
 Under the current Chinese political and legal system, it is unlikely 
for the courts to develop a judge-made industry-specific obviousness 
standard.  Though the Chinese patent system has generally adopted the 
European problem-and-solution approach in determining obviousness, 
the patent office has employed special obviousness rules for chemical 
compound and biotechnology inventions.  In addition to China, the 
Japanese patent system is another example which has expressly 
provided an industry-specific obviousness standard in its Examination 
Guidelines. 
F.  Obviousness in Japan 
 The determination of inventive step under the Japanese patent 
system is generally based on the comparison between the claimed 
invention and one of the cited references which is considered the most 
suitable for the reasoning.201  One single cited reference is selected for 
 
196. Id. § 9.4.2.1(1). 
197. Id. § 9.4.2.1(5). 
198. Id. § 9.4.2.2(1). 
199. Id. § 9.4.2.2(2). 
200. Id. 
201. Examination Guidelines for Patent and Utility Model in Japan, pt. II, ch. 2, § 
2.4(2) (Japan Patent Office, June 2006) (hereinafter Japanese Examination Guidelines). 
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this purpose.202  However, the Examination Guidelines do not exclude 
examiners from taking other cited inventions or even general common 
knowledge into account as the basis of comparison.203  Similar to 
Germany, the Japanese patent system also provides utility model 
protection.204 
 As provided in the Examination Guidelines, the Japanese inventive-
step test is basically comprised of four steps: first, finding of the claimed 
invention and one or more cited inventions; second, selecting one cited 
invention most suitable for the reasoning; third, comparing the claimed 
invention with the most suitable prior art; fourth, clarifying the 
identicalness and the difference in matters defining the inventions.205  If 
reasoning can be made based on the contents of the most suitable prior 
art, other cited inventions, and the common general knowledge, then 
the claimed invention lacks an inventive step.206  On the other hand, if 
the reasoning cannot be made, the claimed invention cannot be denied 
its involvement of an inventive step.207 
 Similar to the selection of the closest prior art in the EPO problem-
and-solution approach, the Japanese inventive-step test includes the 
step of selecting the most suitable prior art.208  This step is deemed as a 
means to reduce the effects of hindsight on the decision of 
obviousness.209 
 The Japanese Examination Guidelines also provide a method in 
handling selection inventions, which involves the finding of 
advantageous effects.210  A selection invention involves an inventive step 
when it generates an advantageous effect, which is not disclosed in a 
cited reference.211  An advantageous effect is defined as an effect which 
is advantageous in comparison with an effect of a cited invention, 
among the effects derived from the matters defining a claimed 
invention.212  An advantageous effect can be found when the invention is 
 
202. Id. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. pt. X, ch. 1–2. 
205. Id. pt. II, ch. 2, § 2.4(2). 
206. Id. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. 
209. Tomotaka Homma, Comparing Japanese and U.S. Standards of Obviousness: 
Providing Meaningful Guidance After KSR, 48 IDEA 449, 483 (2008). 
210. Japanese Examination Guidelines, supra note 200, § 2.5(3). 
211. Id. 
212. Id. 
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qualitatively different, or qualitatively the same but quantitatively 
prominent, in comparison with that of a cited invention disclosing a 
generic concept, provided that neither of the effect can be foreseen by a 
person skilled in the art from the state of the art.213  However, regardless 
of the finding of advantageous effects, inventive step may be denied if a 
person skilled in the art could have easily arrived at a claimed 
invention.214  Basically, an “advantageous effect” is the Japanese 
equivalent of the “unexpected technical effects compared with the prior 
art” under the Chinese patent system. 
 The Japanese patent system is another example, which has provided 
industry-specific obviousness standards for biological inventions 
expressly in its Examination Guidelines.  For instance, the inventive 
step of inventions involving genetic engineering and microorganisms are 
treated differently than other subject matter.215  Inventions resulting 
from genetic engineering are further divided into five basic categories.216  
They are genes, recombinant vectors, transformants, fused cells, and 
monoclonal antibodies.217  Nevertheless, unlike biological inventions, the 
Examination Guidelines state that the inventive step analysis regarding 
medicinal inventions is not different from the general test though the 
Guidelines have devoted great length in explaining what constitutes a 
concrete practice of the judgment.218 
 The Japanese patent system has arguably adopted a higher 
obviousness standard because it allows patent examiners more leeway in 
considering prior art or evidence compared to the EPO’s problem-and-
solution approach.  However, similar to the German patent system, a 
higher obviousness standard in Japan can be justified because the 
system provides utility model protection to inventions with relatively 
minor inventiveness, in addition to an agency-made biotechnology-
specific obviousness standard. 
 In the United States, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals had 
developed a more rigid and arguably restrictive obviousness test, until 
the Supreme Court rendered its KSR decision in 2007.  To some extent, 
the American patent system may be deemed as the fourth type of 
obviousness approach after KSR.  That is, a higher obviousness standard 
 
213. Id. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. pt. VII, ch. 2, § 1–2. 
216. Id. § 1.3.3. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. ch. 3, § 2.3. 
SU FINAL 5-17-10 5/19/2010  2:29 PM 
352 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:2 
 
without a safety-net provision comparable to the utility model system. 
V.  OBVIOUSNESS IN THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM 
 The “consistency, uniformity, and familiarity with the extensive and 
relevant body of patent jurisprudence” is the underlying policy for the 
creation of the Federal Circuit.219  As Justice Stevens stated in his 
dissenting opinion in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Board v. 
College Saving Bank,220 which cited Graham,221 “[t]here is, . . . a strong 
federal interest in an interpretation of the patent statutes that is both 
uniform and faithful to the constitutional goals of stimulating invention 
and rewarding the disclosure of novel and useful advances in 
technology.”222 
 The Federal Circuit’s experiment in developing a more rigid 
obviousness test was halted by the Supreme Court’s KSR decision.  
Nevertheless, another experiment in developing a judge-made industry-
specific obviousness standard was somehow undisturbed. 
 Though the KSR court revered Graham as the highest principle in 
making obviousness determinations, the KSR decision has essentially 
created the same problem that the Graham court sought to resolve.  
That is, the inconsistency among the courts and the Patent Office. 
A.  TSM Test 
 Before KSR, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeal and its 
predecessor had developed a teaching-suggestion-motivation (TSM) 
test.223  Similar to the EPO’s problem-and-solution approach, the TSM 
test was designed to guard against hindsight judgment especially in the 
situation where more than one reference needs to be considered.224  The 
European problem-and-solution approach does not have the same 
problem because of its selection of one single closest prior art, rather 
than multiple references, as the basis of comparison with the claimed 
invention. 
 The TSM test is part of the Federal Circuit and its predecessor’s 
anti-hindsight jurisprudence, as well as the “motivation to combine” 
 
219. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Bd. v. College Saving Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 
650–52 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
220. Id. at 650 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
221. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
222. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Bd., 527 U.S. at 650 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
223. Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 1290 (C.A. Fed. 2006). 
224. See id. 
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requirement.225  Under the TSM test, “a court must ask ‘whether a 
person of ordinary skill in the art, possessed with the understandings 
and knowledge reflected in the prior art, and motivated by the general 
problem facing the inventor, would have been led to make the 
combination recited in the claims.’”226  The legal determination of 
obviousness “should be based on evidence rather than mere speculation 
or conjecture.”227  Such evidence includes expert testimony regarding the 
knowledge that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have 
possessed at a given time.228 
 Under the Federal Circuit’s obviousness jurisprudence, “motivation 
to combine” alone is not sufficient to find obviousness.  In addition to 
the “motivation to combine” the prior art, it is a predicate to the finding 
of obviousness that the motivation of a person of ordinary skill in the art 
needs to be coupled with a “reasonable expectation of success” in doing 
so.229 
 Prior to KSR, the Federal Circuit stated in Alza Corp. v. Mylan 
Laboratories, Inc. that the teaching, suggestion, or motivation to 
combine the relevant prior art teachings “does not have to be found 
explicitly in the prior art.”230  “[T]he teaching, motivation, or suggestion 
may be implicit from the prior art as a whole.”231  However, implicit 
teaching, suggestion, or motivation is subject to a limitation.  That is, 
“rejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere 
conclusory statements.”232  “[T]here must be some articulated reasoning 
with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of 
obviousness.”233 
 Like other patent systems, the Federal Circuit had cautioned about 
the use of “obvious to try.”  However, unlike the Canadian Supreme 
Court, which has interpreted “obvious to try” as a high standard to 
meet,234 the Federal Circuit was of the opinion that ‘“obvious to try’’ is 
 
225. See id. 
226. Id. (citing Cross Med. Prods., Inc., v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 
1293, 1321–24 (C.A. Fed. 2005)). 
227. Id. 
228. Id. at 1294. 
229. Id. at 1293. 
230. Id. at 1290. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. at 1291. 
233. Id. 
234. See Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., [2008] 69 C.P.R. (4th) 251, ¶ 
66 (Can.). 
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not a standard under § 103.235 
 As the Federal Circuit explained in In re O’Farrell, “obvious to try” 
often leads to mainly two kinds of errors.236  First, where the prior art 
gave either no indication of which parameters were critical or no 
direction as to which of many possible choices is likely to be successful, 
though it is obvious to try, the inventor has to vary all parameters or try 
each of numerous possible choices before reaching a successful result.237  
Second, where the prior art gave only general guidance, though it is 
obvious to try, what the inventor is doing is to explore a new technology 
or general approach that seemed to be a promising field of 
experimentation.238 
 Commentators have also cautioned about the use of “obvious to 
try.”  For instance, George S.A. Szabo has cautioned about using 
“obvious to try” in determining obviousness by explaining the 
connection among reasonable expectation of success, obvious to try, and 
the size of the reward.239  In view of a high probability of success, a 
degree of uncertainty or some residual risk may remain, even if obvious 
to try.240  When the expected size of the reward is low, there should be 
no obvious good reason for a skilled person to try, and therefore it may 
be oddly found non-obvious.241  On the other hand, when the expected 
size of the reward is enormous, there is obvious good reason to try, even 
if the degree of uncertainty or residual risk remains high.242  As a result, 
it may be oddly found obvious.243  The odd results should be avoided in 
estimating the mental likelihood for a skilled person to proceed with the 
available information toward the invention in certain disciplines, such as 
chemistry, pharmacy, and biotechnology. 
 Moreover, it appeared that “obvious to try” was merely a factor 
under the “reasonable expectation of success” standard, rather than a 
separate test, under the obviousness jurisprudence established by the 
Federal Circuit before KSR.244  As Professor Merges has observed, “[i]f 
 
235. See, e.g., In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903 (C.A. Fed. 1988); In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 
1552, 1559 (C.A. Fed. 1995). 
236. In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d at 903. 
237. Id. 
238. Id. 
239. Szabo, supra note 64, at 475. 
240. Id. 
241. Id. 
242. Id. 
243. Id. 
244. Merges, supra note 49, at 42. 
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an inventor is faced with a large number of variables, and the prior art 
does not provide enough guidance to narrow those down to a 
manageable level, then an inventive step is needed to proceed.”245  
Consequently, the skilled person in the art could not be reasonably 
certain of success, and it rendered the invention non-obvious.246  On the 
other hand, based on the Federal Circuit’s “obvious to try” cases, such 
as Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Laboratories, Inc.,247 “if the number of 
possible permutations has been limited by the prior art, then a mechanic 
could plod through them one at a time and be reasonably certain of 
success.”248  Therefore, the finding of “obvious to try” alone, without 
more, does not render an invention obvious. 
 Long before KSR, the Federal Circuit had demonstrated a judge-
made industry-specific obviousness standard in the biotechnology 
context that has taken the nature of the specific technology into 
consideration.  For instance, it was suggested in In re Bell249 and was 
reaffirmed in In re Deuel that “the existence of a general method of 
isolating cDNA or DNA molecules is essentially irrelevant to the 
question whether the specific molecules themselves would have been 
obvious, in the absence of other prior art that suggests the claimed 
DNAs.”250  This principle has recognized the building-block nature of 
biotechnology research.251 
 The Federal Circuit has also concluded that chemistry, 
pharmaceutical research, and biotechnology are inherently uncertain 
disciplines.252  Though the Federal Circuit is in the view that the results 
of biotechnology research are unforeseeable or unpredictable and thus 
may avoid the problem of obviousness, the court has imposed an 
 
245. Id. 
246. Id. 
247. Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d 804 (C.A. Fed. 1989). 
248. Merges, supra note 49, at 42. 
249. In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781 (C.A. Fed. 1993). 
250. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (C.A. Fed. 1995). 
251. For example, the laboratory handbook entitled Molecular Cloning: a Laboratory 
Manual, which was published by the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Press, is widely used in 
almost every biotechnology laboratory as a basic research tool.  Nonetheless, the handbook 
providing standard research procedures in the industry was cited in various cases as one of 
the prior art providing “motivation to combine.” See, e.g., In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1360 
(C.A. Fed. 2009). “Valiante cites to the very same cloning manual, Sambrook, cited by Kubin 
and Goodwin for their proposition that the gene sequence is identified and recovered ‘by 
standard biochemical methods.’” Id. 
252. See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1208–09 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (finding that biotechnology is an uncertain discipline); Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 
1655. 
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extremely stringent standard for disclosure and description.253  As a 
result, biotechnology patents may be relatively easier to pass the 
Federal Circuit’s obviousness standard, but the accompanying high 
enablement and written description standards dramatically narrow the 
scope of the patents eventually issued.254  The Federal Circuit’s practice 
before KSR, to some extent, had avoided the broad blocking-patent 
problems in the biotechnology industry while offering patent 
protections as the industry needed. 
 As Professors Burk and Lemley have observed, the Federal 
Circuit’s jurisprudence has increasingly treated patents from various 
industries differently.255  For instance, “the Federal Circuit has gone to 
inordinate lengths to find biotechnological inventions non-obvious, even 
if the prior art demonstrates a clear plan for producing the invention.”256  
Though Professors Burk and Lemley have a different view concerning 
obviousness standards for biotechnology inventions, the Federal 
Circuit’s practice has essentially echoed Professors Burk and Lemley’s 
proposal for a judge-made industry-specific patentability standard. 
 In the mean time, Professors Burk and Lemley criticized the 
Federal Circuit that “while the patent statute leaves ample room for 
courts to consider the needs of particular industries, the Federal Circuit 
has proven somewhat reluctant to embrace its role in setting patent 
policy.”257  “Not only has it proven unwilling to pay much attention to 
the empirical evidence about innovation, but it has also taken a number 
of steps toward eliminating the flexible standards of the patent common 
law in favor of bright-line rules.”258  It was the general dissatisfaction of 
the Federal Circuit’s attempt in setting bright-line rules, if any, which 
led to the Supreme Court’s KSR decision in 2007. 
 
253. Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1681.  Alternatively, Professors Burk & Lemley 
suggested that “a fairly high obviousness threshold coupled with a fairly low disclosure 
requirement will produce a few very powerful patents in uncertain industries.” Id. at 1682. “It 
will therefore solve the anti-commons problem often identified with biotechnology while at 
the same time boosting incentives to innovate.” Id.  However, biotechnology research 
requires high level of precision. Without high level of disclosure in prior art, researchers 
referring to the prior art would fall into undue experimentation and it would in turn increase 
inefficiency in research and impede innovation. 
254. Id. at 1678. 
255. Id. at 1593. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. at 1579. 
258. Id. 
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B.  KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. 
 The Supreme Court in KSR disagreed with the Federal Circuit’s 
rigid application of the TSM test and favored an expansive and flexible 
approach instead.259  Nevertheless, it may be beyond the KSR court’s 
expectation that its KSR decision has created the same problem that its 
predecessor sought to resolve in Graham260 more than four decades ago. 
 The framework for applying the statutory language of § 103 was set 
out by the Supreme Court in Graham.261  Though the Supreme Court in 
KSR embraced the obviousness principles laid out in Graham, the KSR 
decision has unexpectedly created the same problem confronting the 
Graham court more than forty years ago.  That is, “a notorious 
difference between the standards applied by the Patent Office and by 
the courts.”262 
 KSR is a case involving a mechanical invention, namely an 
“adjustable pedal assembly with electronic throttle control.”263  The KSR 
court identified the principles set forth in Graham as an objective 
analysis.264  The Graham test is the following: 
 
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be 
determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at 
issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the 
pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness 
or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. Such 
secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but 
unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give 
light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject 
matter sought to be patented.265 
 
 It is worth noting that the Supreme Court in KSR did not oppose  
the TSM test but that the Federal Circuit has applied it too rigidly in the 
case at issue.  The KSR court also recognized that the principles laid out 
in KSR may not be applicable outside the factual context of that case.266  
 
259. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 411 (2007). 
260. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
261. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 407. 
262. Graham, 383 U.S. at 18. 
263. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 405. 
264. Id. 
265. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18; KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 405. 
266. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 417. 
Following these principles may be more difficult in other cases than it is here 
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As the KSR court has stated, “[t]here is no necessary inconsistency 
between the idea underlying the TSM test and the Graham analysis.”267  
However, “when a court transforms the general principle into a rigid 
rule that limits the obviousness inquiry, as the Court of Appeals did 
here, it errs.”268  “What we hold is that the fundamental 
misunderstandings identified above led the Court of Appeals in this case 
to apply a test inconsistent with our patent law decisions.”269 
 In rejecting the rigid application of the TSM test, it appears that a 
rigid step-by-step obviousness analysis, such as the EPO’s problem-and-
solution approach, may not be acceptable in the Supreme Court’s 
view.270  Instead, the Supreme Court seemed to suggest that the analysis 
of obviousness should be industry-specific.271 
 In addition to the rejection of a rigid application of the TSM test, 
the KSR court also faulted the Federal Circuit’s long-standing caution 
about “obvious to try.”272  However, the KSR court’s statement about 
“obvious to try” may be subject to various interpretations, as its 
declaration regarding the “expansive and flexible” approach.  For 
instance, on the one hand, the KSR court appeared to be of the opinion 
that merely “obvious to try” is sufficient to find obviousness.273  On the 
other hand, the Court seemed to suggest that several conditions, such as 
a finite number of identified solutions and anticipated success, need be 
met before “obvious to try” amounts to obviousness.274 
 
because the claimed subject matter may involve more than the simple substitution of 
one known element for another or the mere application of a known technique to a 
piece of prior art ready for the improvement. 
Id. 
267. Id. at 419. 
268. Id. 
269. Id. at 422. 
270. See id., at 419.  “The obviousness analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic 
conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasis on the 
importance of published articles and the explicit content of issued patents.” Id. 
271. See id.  “The diversity of inventive pursuits and of modern technology counsels 
against limiting the analysis in this way.” Id. 
272. Id. at 421. 
273. Id.  “The same constricted analysis led the Court of Appeals to conclude, in error, 
that a patent claim cannot be proved obvious merely by showing that the combination of 
elements was ‘obvious to try.’” Id. 
274. Id. 
When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a 
finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good 
reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to 
the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill 
and common sense. In that instance the fact that a combination was obvious to try 
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 The Supreme Court in KSR acknowledged the importance of 
avoiding hindsight judgment,275 yet it has rejected a rigid step-by-step 
approach of obviousness analysis.  It leaves open for the later courts to 
develop a device serving such purposes.  As examined in Part III, an 
industry-specific obviousness standard may be an appropriate solution.  
Moreover, as a common law system, the United States has more leeway 
to develop a judge-made industry-specific obviousness standard than 
civil law systems, such as China or Japan, which have no option but to 
promulgate agency rules in the Examination Guidelines. 
 Though the Supreme Court identified the Graham test as an 
objective one,276 the irony is, if a test is expansive and flexible it may be 
subject to various interpretations and inferences.  Consequently, the test 
is more likely than not, subjective.  The inconsistency in its application 
follows suit.  That is what occurred after KSR within the American 
patent system, specifically between the Federal Circuit and the PTO. 
C.  Federal Circuit’s Interpretation and Application of KSR 
 Despite the Supreme Court’s KSR decision, the Federal Circuit 
assures inventors that “a flexible TSM test remains the primary 
guarantor against a non-statutory hindsight analysis.”277  In the post-
KSR era, the Federal Circuit continues to develop its industry-specific 
approach, at least in cases involving chemical arts. 
 KSR is a case involving a mechanical invention, namely an 
“adjustable pedal assembly with electronic throttle control.”278  It is not 
factually similar to a chemical invention, a pharmaceutical invention, or 
a biotechnological invention. 
 After KSR, the Federal Circuit continued to develop its industry-
specific obviousness standard, at least in chemical related fields, with 
little disturbance by KSR.  As Judge Newman has stated in Abbott 
Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc.,279 “[t]he Court in KSR did not create a 
presumption that all experimentation in fields where there is already a 
background of useful knowledge is ‘obvious to try,’ without considering 
 
might show that it was obvious under § 103.  
Id. 
275. Id. 
276. Id. at 405. 
277. Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharmpty, Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1357 (C.A. 
Fed. 2007); Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1364 (C.A. Fed. 
2008). 
278. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 405. 
279. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341 (C.A. Fed. 2008). 
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the nature of the science or technology.”280  It remains that “[e]ach case 
must be decided in its particular context, including the characteristics of 
the science or technology.”281 
 In several cases, the Federal Circuit has expressed the opinions that 
the obvious-to-combine scenario in KSR is difficult to apply to chemical 
arts,282 such as selection of components283 or structurally similar 
compounds,284 without modification.  In the Federal Circuit’s view, such 
flexibility in establishing prima facie obviousness for chemical 
compounds is consistent with the legal principles enunciated in KSR.285  
As Judge Rader has stated in Eisai Co, Ltd. v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, 
Ltd.,286 “[t]o the extent an art is unpredictable, as the chemical arts often 
are, KSR’s focus on these ‘identified, predictable solutions’ may present 
a difficult hurdle because potential solutions are less likely to be 
genuinely predictable.”287 
 Though the Supreme Court in KSR expressly stated that a flexible 
approach of obviousness is desirable, the Court did not define flexibility 
in any material way.  Thus, it can be inferred from the proposal made by 
Professors Burk and Lemley years before KSR that a flexible approach 
of obviousness may include a judge-made industry-specific standard of 
obviousness.  Various industries have different characteristics, and a 
nominally uniform rule would affect them differently.288  As Professors 
Burk and Lemley have suggested, “[i]f the court is to make intelligent 
policy, it must take the needs of those industries into account.”289 
 Professors Burk and Lemley further suggested that courts are better 
situated to engage in tailoring the standard of patentability than the 
legislature.290  “Courts have substantial ability to profile an industry and 
adapt innovation policy according to the profile, within a reasonable 
time frame and at reasonable cost.”291  On the other hand, contrary to 
the “flexible” application of the Supreme Court’s KSR decision in 
 
280. Id. at 1352. 
281. Id. 
282. Eisai Co., Ltd. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., 533 F.3d 1353, 1359 (C.A. Fed. 2008). 
283. Abbott Labs., 544 F.3d at 1351. 
284. Eisai Co., Ltd., 533 F.3d at 1356–57. 
285. Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharmpty, Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1356 (C.A. 
Fed. 2008). 
286. Eisai Co, Ltd., 533 F.3d at 1353. 
287. Id. at 1359. 
288. Burk & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1675. 
289. Id. 
290. Id. at 1668. 
291. Id. 
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Federal Circuit cases, the PTO’s literal application of the KSR decision 
word-by-word in its examination proceeding has essentially created 
another set of rigid and inflexible rules of obviousness. 
D.  U.S. PTO’s Response to KSR 
 Around the time the Supreme Court’s KSR decision was issued, 
statistics showed that the PTO had drastically adopted a higher 
patentability requirement.  Decisions issued by the Board of Appeals 
and Interferences, after KSR, also indicate that the PTO has adopted a 
more generous view of obvious-to-try, which is a significant departure 
from the Federal Circuit’s consistent caution. 
 It is said that the PTO’s post-KSR obviousness rules do not 
constitute substantive rule making and hence do not have the force and 
effect of law.292  If the PTO’s practice is ignored, one may comfortably 
conclude that the obviousness standard did not change much, since the 
Federal Circuit has applied KSR flexibly.  However, before a patent 
applicant can reach any federal court, the applicant has to tackle the 
PTO for years.  Especially for a pharmaceutical or biotechnological 
invention, the patent prosecution on average is much longer than other 
types of patents, and therefore more expensive.293  The aggregate 
expenses of time, money, and other societal resources devoted to the 
lengthy process are too enormous to count. 
 Coincident with the Supreme Court’s issuance of its KSR decision in 
April 2007, the rate of patent rejection reversed by the Board of Patent 
Appeals and Interferences of the PTO dropped approximately 10% in 
fiscal year 2007 compared to the previous year.294  The trend continued 
to fiscal year 2008 and the reverse rate was 23.9%.295  In fiscal year 2009, 
by December 31, 2008, the average reverse rate was as low as 18.6%,296 
compared to approximately 37.7% before KSR, which was the average 
 
292. D. Christopher Ohly et al., It Is Not So Obvious: The Impact of KSR on Patent 
Prosecution, Licensing, and Litigation, 36 AIPLA  Q.J. 267, 281 (2008). 
293. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s Patenting What? An Empirical 
Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2124–32 (2000). 
294. The reporting period of a fiscal year is from October 1, of the previous year to 
September 30, of the present year.  According to the statistics released by the Board of the 
Patent Appeals and Interferences of the PTO, the reverse rate in fiscal year 2007 was 25.1%, 
compared to 34.8% in fiscal year 2006. USPTO, Receipt and Dispositions by Technology 
Center, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/docs/receipts/index.htm (last visited Jan. 
22, 2009). 
295. Id. 
296. Id. 
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reverse rate from fiscal year 2000 to 2006.297  In addition, as Ohly has 
observed, the PTO’s patent allowance rate has dropped approximately 
10% since 2006.298 
 Collectively, the low patent allowance rate at the examination level 
and the low reverse rate at the appellate level suggest that the PTO has 
drastically raised the standard of patentability coincident with the 
issuance of the KSR decision.  However, statistics alone do not 
necessarily reflect how the PTO’s practice has changed or the extent of 
change because there are always other factors that may contribute to 
the figures.299  Therefore, a closer examination into the decisions issued 
by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences of the PTO before 
and after KSR in similar invention contexts may be necessary. 
 Despite the Federal Circuit’s continuous caution about “obvious to 
try” before and after KSR,300 the PTO has interpreted the Supreme 
Court’s KSR teachings as if merely “obvious to try” is sufficient to find 
obviousness.301  For instance, as the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences stated in Ex Parte Kubin,302 “[u]nder KSR, it’s now 
apparent ‘obvious to try’ may be an appropriate test in more situations 
than we previously contemplated.”303  In Ex Parte Kubin, the applicants 
claimed a DNA sequence encoding a polypeptide whose amino acid 
sequence is “at least 80% identical” to a known CD48 binding 
polypeptide.304  In rejecting the applicant’s reliance on In re Deuel, the 
Board stated that “[t]o the extent Deuel is considered relevant to this 
case, we note the Supreme Court recently cast doubt on the viability of 
Deuel to the extent the Federal Circuit rejected an ‘obvious to try’ 
test.”305 
 On the other hand, before KSR, the Board of Patent Appeals and 
 
297. See id. The reverse rate was 38.9% in fiscal year 2000; 36.8% in fiscal year 2001; 
37.4% in fiscal year 2002; 39.1% in fiscal year 2003; 37.4% in fiscal year 2004; and 39.6% in 
fiscal year 2005 respectively. Id. 
298. Ohly et al., supra note 292, at 286. See also Eugene Quinn, PTO Hiring Freeze and 
Budget Problems, http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2009/03/02/pto-hiring-freeze-and-budget-
problems/id=2099/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2009). 
299. Ohly et al., supra note 292, at 286. 
300. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1352 (C.A. Fed. 2008). 
301. See, e.g., Ex Parte Kubin, 2007 WL 2070495 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. May 31, 
2007); Ex Parte Haruo Watanabe, 2008 WL 838777, at *3 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. Mar. 26, 
2008); Ex Parte Trono, 2008 WL 1993030 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. May 7, 2008).  
302. Ex Parte Kubin, 2007 WL 2070495. 
303. Id. at 5. 
304. Id. at 1–2. 
305. Id. at 5. 
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Interferences had consistently found that “obvious to try” alone does 
not constitute obviousness.306  For instance, in Wen-Hwa Lee v. 
Thaddeus P. Dryja, the Board stated that “[a] general incentive does not 
make obvious a particular result, nor does the existence of techniques 
by which those efforts can be carried out.”307  The statement aptly 
recognizes the nature of biotechnology research. 
 As explained in Part III, “obvious to try” is an anomaly in the 
biotechnological and pharmaceutical contexts.  Because of the high 
costs of biotechnology and pharmaceutical research, a research proposal 
is unlikely to receive grants or any sort of financial support without the 
projection of a “reasonable expectation of success.”  Nevertheless, a 
documented “reasonable expectation of success” would render an 
invention “obvious to try” under a “one-size-for-all” obviousness 
jurisprudence.  As a result, only very few, if any, biotechnology or 
pharmaceutical inventions can escape from the suspicion of “obvious to 
try” if the nature of the industry and the characteristic of the technology 
is not taken into consideration. 
 Regardless of the inconsistency of obviousness standard before and 
after KSR, there is uncertainty regarding the obviousness standard in 
the reexamination proceeding for patents issued under the “old” 
obviousness standard before KSR.  It is unclear whether the PTO would 
apply the “new” and higher obviousness standard to reevaluate a patent 
issued under the “old” and lower standard.  If the latter is the case, an 
invention which was found “obvious to try” but nonetheless non-
obvious under the old standard, would be easily struck down under the 
new standard without the assistance of any newly discovered prior art. 
 The Patent Act provides that any person at any time may file a 
request for reexamination by the PTO of any claim of a patent on the 
basis of any prior art cited.308  The Director of the PTO will then 
determine “whether a substantial new question of patentability affecting 
any claim of the patent concerned is raised by the request, with or 
without consideration of other patents or printed publications.”309  If a 
substantial new question of patentability is found, the Director will issue 
an order for reexamination and a reexamination proceeding will 
 
306. See, e.g., Ex Parte Kamboj, 2002 WL 1801076 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf.); Wen-Hwa 
Lee v. Thaddeus P. Dryja, 2005 WL 3121465 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf.). 
307. Wen-Hwa Lee, 2005 WL 3121465 at 30. 
308. 35 U.S.C. § 302. 
309. 35 U.S.C. § 303(a). 
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follow.310 
 It is worth noting that the “substantial new question of 
patentability” does not necessarily rely on a newly discovered issue or 
any newly discovered prior art which did not exist in the examination of 
the original application.  35 U.S.C. § 303(a) provides that “[t]he 
existence of a substantial new question of patentability is not precluded 
by the fact that a patent or printed publication was previously cited by 
or to the Office or considered by the Office.”311  Therefore, the 
threshold for initiating a reexamination proceeding is considerably low. 
 It is well established that patent is a property right312 and it is 
generally understood that patent is a contract between the government 
and the inventor.313  If an obviously higher obviousness standard is 
applied in a reexamination proceeding and the patent previously issued 
under a lower standard is revoked as a result, though the issue has not 
been adjudicated, it may not be excluded that the possibility of a finding 
of governmental takings would follow. 
 The extent to which a person had changed position in reliance upon 
the prior law is an element in Fifth Amendment analysis.314  As the 
Supreme Court has stated in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.,315 “the 
patent system represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages 
both the creation and the public disclosure of new and useful advances 
in technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period 
of time.”316  “It would be manifestly unfair if, after issuing a patent, the 
Government as a representative of the public sought to modify the 
bargain by shortening the term of the patent in order to accelerate 
public access to the invention.”317 
 Governmental takings may arise at the administrative level as well 
as the legislative level.  For instance, “Congress in performance of its 
legislative functions may leave it to administrative officials to establish 
 
310. 35 U.S.C. § 304. 
311. 35 U.S.C. § 303(a). 
312. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 
642 (1999).  “Patents, however, have long been considered a species of property.” Id.  “As 
such, they are surely included within the ‘property’ of which no person may be deprived by a 
State without due process of law.” Id. 
313. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998). 
314. Patlex Co. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 602 (C.A. Fed. 1985). 
315. Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 55. 
316. Id. at 63. 
317. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 226 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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rules within the prescribed limits of the statute.”318  “A statute that is 
valid on its face may nevertheless be administered in such a way that 
constitutional or statutory guarantees are violated.”319  However, though 
the PTO’s generous view concerning “obvious to try” after KSR may be 
unique among major patent systems worldwide, the PTO’s generous 
application is traceable to the Supreme Court’s self-contradictory 
statement regarding “obvious to try.” 
 Nevertheless, there are signs showing that the Federal Circuit may 
have begun cautiously loosening its defensive stance regarding “obvious 
to try.”  After the Board rejected Kubin’s patent application, the 
applicants appealed to the Federal Circuit.320  The Federal Circuit 
affirmed the Board’s rejection on the ground of obviousness.321 
 The Federal Circuit’s recent decision in In re Kubin has resolved the 
inconsistency of obviousness standard between the court and the PTO 
to some extent, though the Federal Circuit has indicated that the Board 
of Patent Appeals and Interferences’s reasoning regarding obviousness 
in Ex Parte Kubin was somehow misguided.322 
E.  In re Kubin 
 In re Kubin signifies the cautious revival of “obvious to try” in the 
biotechnological context under the Federal Circuit’s obviousness 
jurisprudence.323  The court officially rejected the formalistic approach 
as represented by In re Deuel.324  Even so, the decision does not 
contradict the Federal Circuit’s continuing judge-made industry-specific 
obviousness approach because the essence of such approach is 
flexibility. 
 The claim in In re Kubin was directed to the DNA encoding the 
CD-48 binding region of NAIL (Natural Killer Cell Activation Inducing 
Ligand) proteins,325 rather than the DNA encoding the NAIL proteins 
or the NAIL protein itself.  The appellants claimed a genus of DNA 
whose sequences are at least eighty percent identical to the CD-48 
binding region, but the specification only disclosed two examples.326 
 
318. Patlex Co., 758 F.2d at 605. 
319. Id. 
320. In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351 (C.A. Fed. 2009). 
321. Id. at 1361. 
322. Id. at 1356. 
323. Id. at 1359. 
324. Id. 
325. Id. at 1353. 
326. Id. 
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 In that case, the Federal Circuit did not address the issue of 
enablement under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1, because the court had found the 
invention obvious and affirmed the Board’s decision under 35 U.S.C. § 
103(a).327  However, the court should have affirmed the Board’s decision 
under § 112 rather than under § 103.  The insufficient disclosure in this 
application is more obvious than the insufficiency of inventiveness.  
There are technical factual issues unclear in this case regarding the 
extent of inventiveness that may lead to a totally different outcome. 
 The appellants lost the battle probably because they did not draw 
the court’s attention to the critical step in their application, namely the 
discovery that NAIL proteins bind CD-48 proteins and the 
identification of CD-48 binding site on NAIL proteins.328  The claim at 
issue was directed to the CD-48 binding region of NAIL proteins.329  
However, throughout the opinion the court’s discussion of obviousness 
was focusing on DNA encoding the entire NAIL proteins and the amino 
acid sequences of the NAIL proteins as a whole, which has become a 
routine technique in biotechnology research. 
 Though the appellants acknowledged in their application that CD-
48 binding is “a property necessarily present in NAIL,”330 it should be 
noted that the difficulty in identifying a critical binding region on a 
receptor is not comparable to the routine screening of DNA sequences 
encoding the receptor from a commercialized cDNA library.  The issue 
is then how difficult it is to locate the range of the sequences, both in 
DNA and in protein, which determine the specific binding property, 
even if the property can be predicted in general.  The shorter the 
sequence which retains the same property, the higher specificity and 
medical applicability is the peptide in human bodies.  The appellants did 
not explain, and neither the court nor the PTO has considered 
inventiveness on this point. 
 In addition, the court did not address and the appellants did not 
explain how difficult it is to screen the CD-48 as the binding protein of 
NAIL extracellular domain, though the appellant did mention in the 
brief that the Board has completely ignored “the number of options 
related to the ultimate discovery that CD-48, a single protein among the 
 
327. Id. at 1361. 
328. Brief of Marek Z. Kubin and Raymond G. Goodwin at 48, In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 
1351 (2009 WL 877646 (C.A. Fed.)) (No. 2008-1184), 2008 WL 2505893 (C.A. Fed.). 
329. In re Kubin, 561 F.3d at 1353. 
330. Id. at 1357. 
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undeniably large number of human proteins, binds to NAIL.”331  As a 
result, the obviousness of the invention in In re Kubin is not quite 
obvious because certain technical factual issues were unclear when the 
court made the finding of obviousness. 332 
 On the other hand, it is obvious that the written description of the 
application in In re Kubin was not enabling.  As explained in Part III, 
the studies of single mutation or point mutation have shown that, even 
one single deletion, insertion, or substitution either at the DNA level or 
the protein level, may cause drastic change of the characteristics of a 
DNA or protein.  The appellants in In re Kubin claimed all possibilities 
of combination of DNA sequences which are at least eighty percent 
identical to a certain polypeptide.  Some DNA sequences fall within the 
scope may have unique properties due to one single deletion, insertion, 
or substitution of nucleotide.  What the appellants claimed was 
something he or she could not characterize.  In other words, the 
appellants did not have possession of the claimed genus of DNA 
molecules encoding at least eighty percent identical to the CD-48 
binding region of NAIL proteins.333  Therefore, the court should have 
affirmed the Board’s rejection under § 112. 
 The Federal Circuit in In re Kubin also cautiously revived “obvious 
to try” as an indicator of obviousness with some clarification.334  The 
Federal Circuit’s recent rejection of a formalistic approach as 
represented in In re Deuel does not contradict with the Federal Circuit’s 
continuing judge-made industry-specific obviousness standard, since 
flexibility is the essence of such an approach.335 
 The reason why the Federal Circuit had developed a rigid TSM test 
and restricted the application of “obvious to try” in the past may be a 
response to the bias that often resulted from analyzing the combination 
of multiple prior art.336  In the EPO’s practice, the comparison between 
 
331. Brief of Marek Z. Kubin and Raymond G. Goodwin at 33, In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 
1351 (2009 WL 877646 (C.A. Fed.)) (No. 2008-1184), 2008 WL 2505893 (C.A. Fed.). 
332. Though the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s finding that Kubin’s invention 
was obvious, the court pointed out that the Board’s reasoning was misguided.  As the court 
stated, the Board’s “emphasis on similarities or differences in methods of deriving the NAIL 
DNA misses the main point of this obviousness question.” In re Kubin, 561 F.3d at 1356.  
What the appellants claimed was DNA sequences, not cloning technique.  Whether the 
cloning technique is obvious is irrelevant in the analysis. Id. 
333. Id. at 1353. 
334. Id. at 1359.  In referring to In re O’Farrell, the court cautioned that the meaning of 
“obvious to try” is not as broad as what is often misunderstood. Id. 
 335.    In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1560 (C.A. Fed. 1995). 
336. See Alza Corp. v. Mylan Lab., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 1290 (C.A. Fed. 2006). 
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the claimed invention and prior art is limited to one single reference.337  
The combination of multiple prior art indicates that inventive step may 
exist.338 
 It may be appropriate to apply “obvious to try” in In re Kubin.  In 
that case, the Federal Circuit has essentially reduced the prior art under 
consideration to one single reference.339  Therefore, it is proper to 
caution that whenever “obvious to try” is to apply, the cited references 
for comparison should be able to reduce to one or two as the court did 
in In re Kubin.  In doing so, hindsight judgment and bias would be 
avoided. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 Avoiding hindsight judgment and being more objective are the 
universal and ultimate goals of obviousness analysis in almost every 
patent system.  An expansive and flexible obviousness approach as 
stated in KSR should not be literally applied to all types of inventions 
without further consideration. 
 An expansive and flexible approach is inconsistent with the 
international norms of obviousness analysis if it is literally applied.  For 
instance, the problem-and-solution approach in the EPO practice, which 
is followed by numerous countries, is a rigid step-by-step test.  Even if 
an expansive and flexible obviousness approach is preferable and can be 
justified, the need for flexibility should be interpreted in a way that an 
industry-specific obviousness standard is favorable, as exemplified by 
the Canadian selection patent doctrine and its application in 
pharmaceutical cases, which is traceable to English case law. 
 Though the KSR court reversed Graham as the highest principle in 
making obviousness determinations, the KSR decision has unexpectedly 
created the same problem that the Graham court sought to resolve.340  
That is, the inconsistency among the courts and the Patent Office.  The 
 
337. Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, supra note 65, pt. C, 
ch. IV, § 11.7.1. 
338. Id. § 11.8. 
339. The Board rejected appellants’ claims over the combined teachings of Valiante, 
Sambrook, and Mathew. In re Kubin, 561 F.3d at 1353.  Nevertheless, the Board found 
Mathew’s teachings only cumulative. Id. at 1354.  Furthermore, as the Federal Circuit stated 
that the Board’s emphasis on the similarities or differences in methods misses the main point 
of the obviousness question, Sambrook’s teachings in Molecular Cloning: A Laboratory 
Manual has essentially been disregarded, though mentioned, in the “obvious to try” analysis. 
See id. at 1356. 
340.   KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 407 (2007). 
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KSR decision has created legal uncertainty regarding obviousness from 
at least three aspects: first, the inconsistency between the Federal 
Circuit and the PTO; second, the inconsistency between the PTO’s 
practice before and after the KSR decision; and third, the uncertainty of 
the obviousness standard in a re-examination proceeding for a patent 
issued before KSR.341 
 Because of the high costs of biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
research, a research proposal is unlikely to receive grants or any sort of 
financial support without the projection of a “reasonable expectation of 
success.”  Nevertheless, a documented “reasonable expectation of 
success” would render an invention “obvious to try” under a “one-size-
for-all” obviousness jurisprudence.  As a result, only very few, if any, 
biotechnology or pharmaceutical inventions can escape from the 
suspicion of “obvious to try.”  Consequently, “obvious to try” may not 
be an appropriate test under § 103 in the biotechnological and 
pharmaceutical contexts under most circumstances. 
 Even if the application of “obvious to try” is desirable for certain 
inventions, as shown in In re Kubin, a close examination and elimination 
of cited references should be conducted before “obvious to try” can be 
applied.  If multiple references demonstrate equal weights to the 
invention at issue and none of them can be regarded as cumulative, then 
it may be an indication that the invention is non-obvious. 
 
 
341.  Id. at 398. 
